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Essay
Judging adaptive management practices
of U.S. agencies
Robert L. Fischman∗ and J.B. Ruhl†
∗Maurer School of Law, Indiana University, 211 S. Indiana Avenue, Bloomington, IN 47405, U.S.A., email rfischma@indiana.edu
†Vanderbilt University Law School Nashville, TN 37203, U.S.A.
Abstract: All U.S. federal agencies administering environmental laws purport to practice adaptive manage-
ment (AM), but little is known about how they actually implement this conservation tool. A gap between the
theory and practice of AM is revealed in judicial decisions reviewing agency adaptive management plans. We
analyzed all U.S. federal court opinions published through 1 January 2015 to identify the agency AM practices
courts found most deficient. The shortcomings included lack of clear objectives and processes, monitoring
thresholds, and defined actions triggered by thresholds. This trio of agency shortcuts around critical, iterative
steps characterizes what we call AM-lite. Passive AM differs from active AM in its relative lack of management
interventions through experimental strategies. In contrast, AM-lite is a distinctive form of passive AM that fails
to provide for the iterative steps necessary to learn from management. Courts have developed a sophisticated
understanding of AM and often offer instructive rather than merely critical opinions. The role of the judiciary
is limited by agency discretion under U.S. administrative law. But courts have overturned some agency
AM-lite practices and insisted on more rigorous analyses to ensure that the promised benefits of structured
learning and fine-tuned management have a reasonable likelihood of occurring. Nonetheless, there remains
a mismatch in U.S. administrative law between the flexibility demanded by adaptive management and the
legal objectives of transparency, public participation, and finality.
Keywords: conservation planning, law, North America, politics and policy
Evaluación de las Prácticas de Manejo Adaptativo de las Agencias de los EUA
Resumen: Todas las agencias federales de los EUA que administran las leyes ambientales afirman practicar
el manejo adaptativo (MA), pero se conoce poco sobre cómo implementan realmente esta herramienta de
la conservación. Se ha revelado un vaćıo entre la teoŕıa y la práctica del MA en las decisiones judiciales
que revisan los planes de manejo adaptativo de las agencias. Analizamos todas las opiniones de las cortes
federales de los EUA, publicadas hasta el 1 de enero de 2015, para identificar las prácticas de MA de
las agencias que las cortes encontraron más deficientes. Las limitaciones incluyeron la carencia de objetivos
y procesos claros, el monitoreo de los umbrales y las acciones definidas activadas por los umbrales. Esta
triada de atajos tomados por las agencias para evitar pasos cŕıticos e iterativos caracteriza a los que nosotros
llamamos MA ligero. El MA pasivo difiere del activo en su carencia relativa de intervenciones de manejo a
través de estrategias experimentales. En contraste, el MA-ligero es una forma distintiva de MA pasivo que
falla en proporcionar los pasos iterativos necesarios para aprender del manejo. Las cortes han desarrollado
un entendimiento sofisticado del MA y continuamente ofrecen opiniones instructivas en lugar de opiniones
cŕıticas. El papel del poder judicial es limitado por la discreción de las agencias bajo la ley administrativo de
los EUA, pero las cortes han anulado algunas prácticas de MA ligero de las agencias y han insistido en análisis
más rigurosos para asegurar que los beneficios prometidos del aprendizaje estructurado y el manejo bien
calibrado tengan una probabilidad razonable de ocurrir. Sin embargo, todav́ıa persiste una desigualdad en
la ley administrativa de los EUA entre la flexibilidad exigida por el manejo adaptativo y los objetivos legales
de la transparencia, la participación pública y la finalidad.
Palabras Clave: leyes, Norte América, planeación de la conservación, poĺıticas y normas
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Introduction
Adaptive management (AM) is an almost universally ac-
claimed conservation tool. Uncertain climate-change ef-
fects, ignorance about the causes of imperiled species
declines, and the stochastic behavior of ecosystems
are common justifications for using AM. In the 1990s,
U.S. federal agencies began adopting AM in their plans
and permitting processes. It is now standard practice
(Williams et al. 2009; 36 C.F.R. § 219.12[d][2]), as are law-
suits challenging agency decisions. Although few other
nations subject public decisions to as much judicial
scrutiny as the United States, AM is now widely incor-
porated in statutes and rules around the world (Schramm
& Fishman 2010).
We surveyed all U.S. judicial opinions that resolved le-
gal disputes involving federal government AM. The court
decisions highlight especially controversial projects but
also unveil a cross section of agency practice. In par-
ticular, they show how agencies facing resource, polit-
ical, and legal constraints respond by pulling together
AM plans that often neglect key steps in the process.
We call this kind of adaptive management AM-lite, a
watered-down version of the structured-learning-based
theory that “resembles ad hoc contingency planning”
(Ruhl & Fischman 2010:426). Understanding this prag-
matic approach of agencies offers important lessons for
improved conservation. Specifically, AM-lite falls largely
outside the framework in the literature that distinguishes
passive from active AM. Instead, it represents a differ-
ent version of AM that raises questions about whether
the tool’s theoretical advantages may be realized in the
various forms of practice that diverge from the process
described in the literature. This analysis of judicial opin-
ions reveals AM examples that might spur researchers to
recalibrate their thinking to better match what actually
happens in natural resources administration.
Forms of Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is supposed to be an iterative pro-
cess in which decision outcomes are continually mon-
itored and evaluated to determine whether they are
achieving objectives. The feedback loops rely on goal
establishment, model building, performance standard set-
ting, outcome monitoring, and recalibration. Over time,
feedback and adjustments provide flexibility in the face
of uncertainty while simultaneously reducing uncertainty
through systematic learning (Nie & Schultz 2012). Al-
though the basic theme of learning by doing pervades all
forms of AM, there is wide variation in practice. The most
common distinction in the literature separates active
from passive AM along a continuum of management inter-
ventions, particularly the use of experimental strategies
(Walters & Hilborn 1978; McCarthy & Possingham 2007;
Williams 2011; Williams & Brown 2012). The disparate
literature includes a more mathematical framework that
focuses on whether anticipated learning is considered
when making each decision as a basis for distinguish-
ing the two approaches (Williams et al. 2002). The al-
gorithmic framework for quantitative optimization has
practical application in waterfowl management and other
tasks for which substantial data are available (Williams &
Johnson 1995). But the conflicts courts have evaluated in-
volve decisions for which biostatistical models gain little
traction.
In the active form of AM, managers deliberately probe
for information to evaluate testable hypotheses about
the effects of intervention. For example, managers might
evaluate the effects that a chosen habitat alteration and
its alternatives have on invasive species by running small-
scale test plot experiments. Active AM can identify opti-
mal budget allocations to achieve the maximum area of
successful revegetation, as defined by a certain density of
vegetation present 20 years after planting (McCarthy &
Possingham 2007). The normative ideal for strong infer-
ences from experiments is closely associated with active
AM involving replication, controls, and randomization
(Prato 2005; Grantham et al. 2009). However, resource
management, particularly over small areas, often involves
a single system where replication and controls are infea-
sible. In that situation, active AM would provide struc-
tured decision-making tools that seek to optimize both
management success and learning (Nichols & Williams
2012).
Passive AM can be any variation of AM that falls along
a decreasing continuum of scientific rigor for hypothesis
testing. It has thus been characterized as “nonexperimen-
tal” and “nonscientific” (Aldridge et al. 2004), “incom-
plete” and “haphazard” (Gregory et al. 2006), “unreliable”
(Prato 2005), and “nonlearning based” (Williams 2011).
Typically, managers make a decision based on the known
historical behavior of the system and “a single best esti-
mate or model for response” (Walters & Holling 1990).
They then monitor the system to gather information for
future learning but treat learning as a byproduct rather
than an essential component of the management decision
(Gregory et al. 2006; Nichols & Williams 2012; Williams &
Brown 2012). Although passive AM is often described as
incremental or sequential (Halbert 1993; Bormann et al.
1999), it is not experimental. Over enough iterations,
and with enough monitoring, the passive approach may
produce the same level of rigor as active AM (Williams
2011), as illustrated by the decades-long annual adjust-
ments of Mallard (Anas platyrhynchos) hunting regula-
tions (Nichols & Williams 2012).
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Federal resource management agencies in the United
States have all adopted policies that promise implementa-
tion of AM (Ruhl & Fischman 2010). Many of the agencies
have led the way in developing the theory of AM, build-
ing on earlier scholarly work (e.g., Williams et al. 2009).
Because the agency policies promise implementation of
AM theory (e.g., 33 C.F.R. §332.2), the conflicts between
agency implementation and agency promise reflect the
tension between practice and theory.
Adaptive Management in U.S. Courts
Seminal scholarship characterized most examples of AM
in practice as passive (Walters & Hilborn 1978), partic-
ularly because the complexity of dynamic optimization
frustrates decision makers seeking to reduce uncertainty
while also achieving management objectives. We find
that the practice of many U.S. agencies, while generally
a form of passive AM, diverges from the theoretical liter-
ature in other, seldom-noted dimensions revealed in the
litigation. Although it is feasible to build into final agency
actions some AM flexibility, it remains a challenge many
agencies struggle with, particularly in circumstances of
high uncertainty and little prior information. This has
been the focus of the judicial decisions criticizing agency
AM and recent agency initiatives to better mold adaptive
plans to legal constraints.
Public agencies must operate within the structure of
administrative law, built on a model of comprehensive
rationality: all factors influencing a decision and its con-
sequences must be considered before making a final
decision. Once made, an agency must stick with final
decisions until it reengages the administrative process
to alter them. Adaptive management, in theory, is more
open-ended and considers no decisions beyond revision
to improve outcomes or learning. If the decision is adopt-
ing a long-term plan, the agency cannot adjust it with-
out going through the arduous administrative process
of amendment. Also, substantive laws (e.g., the Endan-
gered Species Act [ESA]) require findings (e.g., that an
action authorized by an agency will not jeopardize the
continued existence of an imperiled species [16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2)]) before federal actions (e.g., an oil and gas
leasing plan) may proceed and each time a plan is revised.
Fiscal and political constraints also complicate AM
implementation by public agencies. Both generally en-
courage agencies to defer determining whatever is not
absolutely necessary for a final agency action. They lead
agencies to employ AM-lite, which frequently fails even to
structure a learning procedure, whether through exper-
imentation, historical research, or modeling (NRC 2004;
Nie & Schultz 2012). It lacks a priori hypotheses. It is
similar to “evolutionary adaptive management,” defined
as trial and error, or learning from management without
purposeful direction (Walters & Holling 1990). Trial and
error might lead to learning, but it is not the structured
learning promised in AM. In its most extreme form, AM-
lite is essentially open-ended contingency planning or on-
the-fly management that promises some loosely described
response to whatever circumstances arise. Implementa-
tion of AM-lite may be suitable where the range of possi-
ble variations in actions and outcomes is small and where
the system is not experiencing novel stressors. But many
of the AM decisions reviewed by courts consist of “basic
trial and error learning in which explicit hypotheses are
absent or vague” (Gregory et al. 2006:2412). The upshot
is that AM remains largely an aspiration—achieving even
passive AM has proven challenging enough.
Judicial Decisions
To gain a deeper understanding of how courts treat in-
stances of AM-lite and what can be learned from the judi-
cial commentary, we examined all federal court opinions
containing the phrase adaptive management as of 1 Jan-
uary 2015 (Supporting Information). Of the 216 opinions
with this term, 102 separate opinions (47%) involved a
challenge to an agency’s AM of environmental or natural
resources. In most (75%) opinions overall, and almost
half (48%) of the opinions in cases directly challenging
an AM element of an agency record, courts used the
phrase adaptive management merely to describe some
aspect of the administrative record not relevant to the
judgment.
However, 53 judicial opinions applied relevant law
directly to some aspect of AM. These are the cases we
evaluated in our examination of U.S. agency practice
of AM-lite (Supporting Information). In this group of
53 opinions, 45% of decisions overturned the agency
decision as “arbitrary and capricious,” a legal standard
deferring to any permissible agency interpretation. In
U.S. administrative law, if a court overturns an agency
record as failing to rationally support a decision (arbitrary
and capricious) or finds some violation of a specific legal
standard (e.g., failing to avoid jeopardy to the continued
existence of an endangered species), then it generally
will suspend and remand the agency decision (send the
decision back to the agency for a new determination).
Procedural violations of law (e.g., failure to complete
an adequate environmental impact analysis) may result
in remands under which an agency cures the defects
in its record but reaffirms the substantive decision. A
court upholding an AM approach does not necessarily
endorse the practice as effective conservation. It merely
finds that the approach did not violate any specific legal
mandate. Additionally, an opinion upholding a particular
AM approach does not necessarily resolve the overall
legal dispute in favor of the agency.
We focused mostly on cases overturning AM-lite be-
cause the resulting opinions identify friction points in
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the administrative process, where AM implementation
often falls short of theory and effectiveness. An arbitrary-
and-capricious finding is not a direct comment on the
rigor of the AM process. A court may reject an agency
decision that is a paragon of active AM because of an
unrelated violation of law. But, when an agency relied
on AM to meet a legal standard (e.g., ensure no jeopardy
to an endangered species) and a court finds fault in that
line of reasoning, the judicial opinion may reveal AM-lite
shortcomings.
We extracted lessons from the cases in which the ad-
versarial process unveiled problems with translating AM
into practice. The court decisions paint a troubling pic-
ture of agencies cloaking their desire to defer decisions or
dodge difficult calls under the AM label. This conclusion
stems from a close reading of the 53 judicial opinions.
Here, we present example cases in which judges clearly
evaluated some aspect of adaptive management in an
agency’s record of decision. In many cases, judicial eval-
uation of AM is murky. A thorough canvass of agency AM
practice is beyond the scope of this article. The difficulty
of funding and litigating cases filters out disputes with
low stakes. Agencies lose litigation only if they perform
particularly poorly in justifying their decisions. Court de-
cisions overturning agency actions are a useful window
into the problems associated with translating AM theory
into administrative practice. But, they cannot reveal the
full extent or frequency of the shortcomings.
AM-lite
Courts that rejected agency AM plans cite a number of
problems that correspond to commonly defined steps
in the iterative process. Although courts evaluated the
plans against legal standards and not AM theory, they
often cited problems in the AM process as reasons to be-
lieve AM-lite will not deliver on its promise. These weak
links in the chain of activities implementing AM roughly
correspond with some of the barriers to successful AM
discussed in the literature (Moser & Eckstrom 2010; Nie
& Schultz 2012; Lindenmayer et al. 2013; Meretsky & Fis-
chman 2014). Passive AM is distinctive in its relative lack
of experiments or other structured forms of management
intervention for hypothesis testing. In contrast, AM-lite is
a particular form of passive AM that skips some iterative
steps necessary to learn from management.
Although pathologies—including lack of stakeholder
engagement, procrastination, and weak leadership—
have been identified as impeding the progress of AM
(Allen & Gunderson 2011), 3 shortcomings in AM im-
plementation recur in judicial cases overturning agency
decisions: failure to establish objectives or failure to de-
scribe monitoring protocols for a plan or project; failure
to define decision thresholds in monitoring; and failure
to identify specific actions that will be triggered when
thresholds are crossed. We characterized AM-lite along
this chain of failures in the order in which iterative deci-
sion making should engage these steps. In practice, many
public decisions involve weaknesses in these categories
rather than total failures. But courts grant agencies the
benefit of the doubt in judicial review. Agencies have
discretion to craft poor AM approaches—a court will
overturn only those that have glaring problems.
Clear Objectives and Process
The first and most critical decisions in devising AM strate-
gies are formulating specific objectives and a process
for monitoring (Stein et al. 2013; Fischman et al. 2014).
Although they are separate steps in AM, establishing ob-
jectives and describing monitoring programs are two
decisions that agencies now usually make to the satis-
faction of courts. Without specific objectives and mon-
itoring, goals may slip and actions designed to achieve
one aim ultimately drift toward different outcomes. Ob-
jectives establish benchmarks against which to measure
progress or indicate when program revision is nec-
essary (Williams et al. 2009). Although AM-lite gen-
erally calls for monitoring, some applications avoid
defining objectives or the means of monitoring them
(Nie & Schultz 2012).
Litigation over grazing on the North Sheep allotments
of the Sawtooth National Forest and Recreation Area
illustrates how courts both uncover and shape agency
implementation of AM-lite. A conservation organization
challenged the agency’s sheep and goat grazing allotment
plans as contravening the mandates of the National Forest
Management Act and the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA). The Forest Service lost the first round of
litigation when a court found that the plans’ AM strategy
failed to explain how they would achieve the Forest Ser-
vice’s objectives to allow grazing only on lands suitable
for and capable of sustaining grazing. They also did not
explain how the agency would monitor conditions. The
environmental analysis in the administrative record stated
that a monitoring plan “will be developed and imple-
mented through an iterative process” but did not describe
the process (Western Watersheds Project 2006:10). The
agency responded with a supplemental analysis the court
subsequently upheld as aligning grazing with forest plan
goals by committing to monitoring “annual indicators” of
range conditions at designated sites. The indicators for
the suitability and capability objectives included numeri-
cal criteria (e.g., >4 inches of stubble height and <30%
sagebrush cover at the end of the grazing season) (West-
ern Watersheds Project 2011). Failure to meet the criteria
under the supplemental commitments triggers specific
actions, such as closing areas and reducing numbers of
livestock.
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Decision Thresholds in Monitoring
Thresholds are signals that something must change
(warnings of problems) or can change (confirmations of
achievements) in the management regime. But AM-lite
often neglects to define these decision thresholds that
trigger mitigation actions or reevaluation (Martin et al.
2009). The AM literature emphasizes the importance of
activating intervention in response to observations (Lin-
denmayer et al. 2013), but thresholds are often absent
in public plans (Meretsky & Fischman 2014). In contrast,
decisions that contain quantitative standards for the de-
ployment of review, mitigation, or some other adaption
action harness the benefits of AM and help prioritize the
key monitoring tasks (Gregory et al. 2006; Nie & Schultz
2012).
The same court that upheld the supplemental North
Sheep allotment plan invited further litigation if the
promised benefits of AM amount only to “a burst of
monitoring” with no consequences for grazing practices
that do not meet the numerical objectives (Western Wa-
tersheds Project 2011:1124). The following year it over-
turned a different agency’s renewal of grazing permits for
failure to meet a regulatory requirement that noncom-
pliance with rangeland health standards result in “ap-
propriate action” to make “significant progress toward
fulfillment” of the standards (43 C.F.R. § 4180.2[c][2]).
The agency set goals and committed to monitoring,
but, if the goals were not met “over time,” then the
agency merely promised adaptive adjustment of graz-
ing restrictions (Western Watersheds Project 2012:1129).
The court found that “the amorphous definition” of
“over time” afforded the agency “a nearly unreviewable
discretion to wave off failures to comply for an un-
specified number of years” (Western Watersheds Project
2012:1129). Specific triggers for changes in management
practices (the decision thresholds) would have improved
AM and secured legal compliance.
In contrast, a court allowed a coal mine fill permit
employing an AM plan with “specific timelines for correc-
tive actions if monitoring reveals noncompliant scores”
(Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition 2012:637). Simi-
larly a court upheld a decision not to designate the dunes
sagebrush lizard (Sceloporus arenicolus) for protection
under the ESA based, in part, on a plan that bound de-
velopments in the lizard’s habitat to minimize and mit-
igate impacts. The agreement required monthly reports
to track habitat and established a threshold to trigger
adaptive reevaluation if habitat loss came “within 7.5%
of the allowed 1% loss in total habitat” (Defenders of
Wildlife 2014:8).
An unusual comparative AM evaluation illustrates the
role of AM thresholds in meeting substantive legal stan-
dards. In a series of decisions, Judge Wanger reviewed
ESA compliance in the operation of California’s Cen-
tral Valley irrigation system regularly between 2006 and
2011. One issue in the litigation was how agencies may
rely on AM to ensure that water operations will not “jeop-
ardize the continued existence” of any listed species (16
U.S.C. § 1535[a][2]). Judge Wanger’s decisions compared
the conservation approaches of the Interior Department’s
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) (responsible for the Delta
smelt [Hypomesus transpacificus]) with the Commerce
Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
(responsible for anadromous fishes). Both agencies em-
ployed AM, but Judge Wanger upheld the NMFS approach
and remanded the FWS plan. The NMFS AM protocol
contained definite, substantive criteria (e.g., temperature
thresholds) that triggered revision of the water system
operations to avoid jeopardy (Pacific Coast Federation
of Fishermen’s Associations 2008). In contrast, the FWS
approach failed to provide enforceable, precise criteria
to serve as thresholds (NRDC 2007).
Specific Actions Triggered by Thresholds
Thresholds identify when action is necessary to adjust
management practices or mitigation. But, AM-lite often
neglects to specify just what that action should be. This
may be because an agency wants to retain its future dis-
cretion or because an effective response is not yet known.
In either event, failure to specify actions triggered by
thresholds can lead to dead ends in what should be the
continuing adaptive iteration cycle.
Courts have identified this missing element in AM-lite
as a basis for remanding inadequate agency decisions.
In Judge Wanger’s ESA review of California Central Val-
ley water management, he overturned the FWS decision
to adopt a procedurally elaborate AM protocol identify-
ing danger thresholds for the Delta smelt. The triggered
action would be convening a working group to “con-
sider” a range of operational changes in the water system
(NRDC 2007:341). Judge Wanger found the mandatory
protocol failed to identify what changes to the system
could improve conditions for the smelt. In contrast, the
NFMS approach identified the enforceable requirements
to be imposed if the system crossed thresholds for the
anadromous fish. In remanding the FWS approach, Judge
Wanger distinguished the Central Valley plan from an
ESA permit for land development in California’s Natomas
Basin that employed “well-defined mitigation measures”
such as conservation land purchases, adjustment of con-
servation reserve size, and modification of agricultural
practices (NRDC 2007). The Central Valley plan lacked
such specificity of responsive actions, even though the
protocol was much more elaborate. Complexity and de-
tail in AM design does not necessarily assure substantive
legal criteria will be met by triggering mitigating actions.
Another court set aside an FWS decision to remove
the grizzly bear (Ursus arctos horribilis) from the list of
species receiving ESA protection. The delisting decision
Conservation Biology
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relied on AM-lite to respond to the decline in whitebark
pine (Pinus albicaulis), an important food source for
the bear. While the agency identified specific monitor-
ing criteria (i.e., thresholds) to detect changes in mor-
tality, litter size, and cub survival, the action triggered
would be a study team effort to “recommend appropriate
management responses” (Greater Yellowstone Coalition
2011:1029). Without explanation of what the responses
might be or their effectiveness in the face of whitebark
loss, the administrative record did not meet the ESA re-
quirements for finding that the grizzly bear is not threat-
ened by the decline in its whitebark food source.
Courts have interpreted mitigation mandates under
several environmental laws to require a showing that
conservation actions be “reasonably specific, certain to
occur, and capable of implementation” (Center for Bi-
ological Diversity 2002:1152). Plans employing AM-lite
often fail to meet this standard even when agencies
commit to achieve “specific, numerical improvements in
habitat quality and survival” (NWF 2011:1126). Promises
to achieve specific goals are not self-executing, and ex-
pressing numerical thresholds in monitoring does not
alone advance goals. Successful AM depends on a plan for
what to do when thresholds are crossed. In remanding an
agency’s no-jeopardy finding for operation of the Pacific
Northwest’s Columbia River dams, a court criticized the
common AM-lite approach of neglecting specific actions
triggered by monitoring in favor of “vague” promises
to act in an unspecified manner when thresholds are
crossed (NWF 2011:1128):
It is one thing to identify a list of actions, or combination
of potential actions, to produce an expected survival im-
provement and then modify those actions through adap-
tive management to reflect changed circumstances. It is
another to simply promise to figure it all out in the future.
Even laws with weaker substantive requirements, such
as NEPA, present courts with questions about triggered
responses. One case overturned an agency environmental
analysis under NEPA for failing to provide enough detail
in its AM plan about mitigation actions for expansion
of a gold mine (South Fork Band Council 2009). The
agency’s AM-lite approach to the plan described a water
monitoring regime with thresholds that would trigger a
“detailed, site-specific plan to enhance or replace the im-
pacted perennial water resources” (USDOI 2008, § 3.2).
The court found that this mitigation approach, which
specified no particular action or technology, did not pro-
vide enough evaluation about the ability to avoid adverse
impacts from the mine.
But other courts reviewing NEPA analysis have upheld
similarly vague mitigation promises. For instance, the first
large-scale use of AM to manage oil and gas lease devel-
opment deferred both the establishment of quantitative
criteria for thresholds and the selection of mitigation
measures (Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership
2010). Nonetheless, a court upheld the plan against a
NEPA challenge, in part because subsequent approvals of
individual drilling permits would be subject to environ-
mental analysis and could adopt site-specific criteria and
mitigation. The court relied on the AM-lite approach in
concluding that the agency took the required “hard look”
at environmental impacts. This look-before-you-leap re-
quirement distills NEPA’s comprehensive rationality ap-
proach. But the court responded that “allowing adaptable
mitigation measures is a responsible decision in light of
the inherent uncertainty of environmental impacts, not
a violation of NEPA” (Theodore Roosevelt Conservation
Partnership 2010:517).
Learning from AM-lite
Although federal agencies commit to AM, litigation re-
veals approaches that fail to produce a structured learning
process. Practicing passive AM more effectively is a prac-
tical improvement that is within reach of U.S. agencies,
and courts sometimes insist on it. Otherwise, AM-lite will
lead to iterative dead ends and possibly discredit AM as
an approach with a poor stewardship record.
Courts grasp the aims and elements of AM. They seek
to impose the constraints of administrative law, which
emphasizes finality and comprehensive rationality. But
courts also appear eager to accommodate the conserva-
tion imperatives of AM (Ruhl & Fischman 2010). The per-
ception that lawsuits are an impediment to AM (Koontz &
Bodine 2008) is unsupported by our review. One court
has even suggested that AM may be necessary where
an agency will likely have to respond to unforeseen cir-
cumstances (Southwest Center for Biological Diversity
2006). Courts have rejected arguments that plans built
around AM are mere “untested” hypotheses that cannot
satisfy the rational-basis test of judicial review (SLDMWA
2011:913). But, courts sometimes reject agency ratio-
nales based on hypotheses when the proposed action
is not accompanied by a plan to collect data to evaluate
the accuracy of the hypotheses (Lands Council 2008).
Courts aid AM when they insist on a plan to learn through
management.
As agencies have established quantitative objectives in
their AM plans, courts have dived deeper into the struc-
ture of the decisions to ensure that the promised ben-
efits of structured learning and fine-tuned management
have a reasonable likelihood of occurring. Federal courts
are now unpacking AM-lite to reveal where agencies
stumble along the way to successful iteration and learn-
ing. This dynamic provides agencies an opportunity and
incentive to learn how to improve their practice of AM.
Courts are most likely to reject AM plans that fail to spec-
ify clear objectives and processes, establish monitoring
thresholds, and define actions triggered by thresholds,
Conservation Biology
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thus suggesting how agencies can most effectively im-
prove their AM practices. Agencies have learned from
their past litigation losses; today they seldom stumble
over the first steps of establishing specific objectives and
processes.
But the courts and agencies working together can
advance the practice of AM only so far. No major fed-
eral statute explicitly authorizes agencies to practice AM,
much less spells out its requirements. Agencies have com-
piled detailed manuals for practicing AM (Williams et al.
2009; Williams & Brown 2012), but courts accord the
manuals only moderate deference. This leaves agencies
uncertain about whether their prescriptions for AM, even
when met, satisfy judicial review when weighed against
the requirements of environmental and administrative
law (Benson & Stone 2013). Legislative standards for AM
would provide agencies and courts more guidance and
certainty.
Beyond providing substantive authority and standards,
some AM scholars have suggested that the iterative
decision-making process can also be promoted through
administrative law reform (Karkkainen 2002; Craig &
Ruhl 2014). Conventional administrative process re-
quirements impose extensive front-end requirements on
agency decisions, including impact analysis and public
participation, and subject final agency decisions to judi-
cial review. Although these requirements are meant to
promote agency transparency, public participation, and
legitimacy, they do not necessarily facilitate iterative deci-
sion making. This mismatch has prompted proposals for
alternative procedural tracks for agencies to follow when
they are authorized to employ AM, designed primarily to
change the ways and times when public participation
and judicial review are available in the AM process. For
example, one proposal would allow agencies to adopt
AM plans after public participation, impact assessment,
and judicial review processes based on special, statutorily
prescribed criteria designed to avoid the AM-lite short-
comings. If the plan fulfills the criteria, its implementa-
tion, including adjustments to actions called for under
the plan, would not be subject to additional rounds of
administrative process (Craig & Ruhl 2014). This latitude
to practice AM would ameliorate the legal requirements
many agency practitioners of AM identify as barriers (Ben-
son & Stone 2013) but would retain the basic procedural
safeguards of administrative law. Implementing such a
procedural regime has thus far been untested.
Consistent funding is also necessary to support AM
in practice, particularly its nerve center—monitoring.
This does not necessarily mean that AM costs more than
conventional management regimes, which also need
monitoring to be effective. But conventional manage-
ment seldom follows through with much monitoring
(Karkkainen 2002). The judicial acceptance of AM should
come at the price of more durable monitoring strategies.
Courts may spur legislatures and agencies to better match
funding to the continual needs of AM. Appropriations for
AM projects could establish endowments or annuities
to assure that the back-end activities (especially
monitoring, triggered actions, and reevaluation) deliver
on the promise of reducing uncertainty. In the long run,
the promise of AM practiced at its fullest—not the
AM-lite version that has prevailed thus far—should be
worth the investment.
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